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U.S. MILITARY FORWARD PRESENCE IN OKINAWA, JAPAN
You might call this the fourth major betrayal of Okinawa. And in each event, decisions have been made with no regard to the people of Okinawa. In 1879, Tokyo replaced the king of the Ryukyu Islands with a governor appointed from Tokyo. In 1945, when the war with the United States was already all but lost, Tokyo fought a last-ditch campaign in Okinawa-the only part of Japan to see ground combat-in which more than 200,000 people were killed. Then in 1952, Tokyo allowed Washington to extend its occupation of Okinawa for 20 more years.
? Professor Nairo Kabiram, Ryukyu University, Okinawa
INTRODUCTION
The statement above reflects the sentiments for many of Okinawa's people with respect to the recent agreements, between the U.S. and Japanese Governments, for the relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS)-Futenma to the northern portion of the island of Okinawa.
This relocation is an extension of a previous pact signed in 1996 as part of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, or SACO as it is referred to, where the U.S. and Japanese Governments agreed in principle to reduce the U.S. military footprint on this tiny southern Japanese island.
To gain a complete insight of where these feelings come from and how the U.S. and Japanese Governments came to draw up the SACO agreements, it is necessary to go back in the historical development of Okinawa. Okinawa is the largest of the Ryukyu Islands chain. Key to this understanding is a thorough awareness of the Battle of Okinawa and the relationship between the U.S. military and the people of Okinawa from 1945 to the present. None of this has any bearing unless there is an accompanying knowledge of the strategic importance of Okinawa as part of the bi-lateral alliance between the U.S. and Japan.
The intent of this paper is three-fold. First, develop a historical perspective of the nature of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan with specific emphasis on that relationship in Okinawa and gain an understanding of the strategic importance of U.S. military access to basing rights and C4ISR capabilities on the island of Okinawa. Second, outline the current policy under SACO and suggest other possible courses of action, offering some benefit and risk trade-off analysis to each, with respect to forward presence in the region. Finally, make recommendations to improve relations with the local people to help alleviate some of the current political and social pressures. Before discussing the aforementioned purpose of this paper, I
will provide a brief overview of the development of what has become the Okinawa Prefecture.
This condensed version of the historical development provides some insight into why I am recommending a change to our current policy.
BRIEF DISCUSSION OF OKINAWA'S (RYUKYU ISLANDS) DEVELOPMENT
Okinawa is the smallest of the forty-seven Japanese-Prefectures, strategically located 400 miles south of the mainland of Japan. The archipelago of the Ryukyu Islands stretches for a great distance, but only 47 of the more than 140 islands that make up this chain are inhabited.
Most historians agree that travelers coming from: northern Asia down through what is today's mainland Japan, from Southeast Asia through the Philippines or the China coast, and finally coming from Mongolia or Manchuria down through the Korean peninsula were the original settlers of the Ryukyu Islands.
1 The Ryukyu's can be considered a "melting pot" of Asian cultures and the people of Okinawa pride themselves on this diversity. This cultural blending and nonviolent approach to life so adeptly described in this quote, " …their gentleness of spirit and manner, their yielding and submissive disposition, their hospitality and kindness, their aversion to violence and crime"
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, contributes significantly to their views of U.S. military forces on the island as well as their perceived treatment by the government of Japan.
The people of the Ryukyu Kingdom originally flourished as farmers, fisherman, and traders for centuries maintaining peaceful relationships with their neighbors. Okinawa's peaceful traditions and strategic location, not only to those nations within the region, especially
Japan, but also to the European nations hoping to expand their trading bases in Asia, made it ripe for hostile takeover. In the early stages of the 17 th century, Japan invaded the Ryukyu Islands to ensure their protection from invasion on their southern boundary. Initially the Japanese left no occupation forces behind, only spies to monitor the terms of the treaty and report on any suspicious activities of a foreign military. In the latter portion of the 19 th century, Japan deposed the king, established a garrison on the island, and formally established Okinawa as a prefecture.
3 As Japan's interests grew within Asia over the years so did Okinawa's importance for protection of Japan's southern littoral approaches. This importance was never more evident than during the final year of WWII, when the Allied Forces in the Pacific made the decision to secure Okinawa as the final staging area for what would be the ultimate last push into mainland Japan.
The effects from the "Battle of Okinawa" on the local people can only be described as devastating. Before the Allied invasion in March of 1945, the Okinawa people unwillingly assisted in the massive defensive preparations for the Japanese Army's final stance and they suffered tremendous casualties in the actual invasion and subsequent battle. Reports from various sources range from 60,000 to over 100,000 killed during the 3-month long operation.
These were the non-combatants, trapped between an advancing U.S. ground force and a retreating Japanese force. Some of the most horrific stories include accounts of Japanese soldiers killing women and children so they did not give away their positions in caves as well as forcing thousands of Okinawans to jump to their deaths from the cliffs on the southeastern tip of the island. 4 Keeping in mind that these were only the civilian casualties; military casualties for the U.S. totaled more than 38, 000, 12,000 of those being killed or missing and more than 107,000 for Japanese and Okinawan conscripts. Roughly, one-third to one-fourth of the total population of Okinawa was killed in this battle. Equipment losses were severe as well with the Allies losing 34 ships, another 368 receiving damage from attacks, and losing 763 aircraft. The Japanese lost 7,830 aircraft and 16 combat ships not to mention the battleship Yamato, which was sunk before ever reaching Okinawa, along with 7 additional combat ships that were dispatched from mainland Japan to accompany her. Oddly enough, the Yamato was dispatched from the mainland with only enough fuel for the voyage to Okinawa, as her mission was to beach herself and fight until destroyed. The Battle for Okinawa was the most costly and bloodiest battle of the Pacific Theater.
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HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
America's position in the Ryukyus is unique: the islands are neither a possession, a colony, nor a trust territory. The archipelago shares the fate of many frontier territories too small and too poor to attract attention in times of peace, but doomed to rise to international prominence during crises among world powers. It lies on the western Pacific Rim, between the maritime world and continental Asia. It cannot escape the consequences of wars and revolutions in larger states nearby: the postwar "Okinawa problem" was produced by events "set in train" long ago by accidents of geography and history.
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The U.S. military has maintained forward deployed forces throughout Japan since the end of WWII. Initially these were occupation forces, but gradually this posture changed with regional and world events and with the signing of the Treaties of Peace and Security in years to lift the town -one of Japan's poorest -out of its relative underdevelopment. Nago has also been promised a spot on the world stage, as the improbable host city to the Group of 7, the world's leading industrial powers, in July of 2000."
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Additionally, the local and international media are well aware of these incidents and never pass up the opportunity to leverage them in the on-going debate of U.S. military presence on the island. There is very little follow-up coverage of any judicial outcomes when service personnel, or their families, are punished or reprimanded for any incidents they are found guilty of committing. This type of media attention is not unusual, even in the United States, but there is no counterbalance reporting with regard to all of the good things U.S. personnel do within the Okinawa community or a reaffirmation of the importance of U.S. military presence within the region. These incidents of personal misconduct are the most visible, both locally and internationally, but are not the only points of contention from the people of Okinawa.
Perhaps the largest single point of debate comes over the specific number of U.S. military personnel stationed here as compared to the remainder of Japan. "There are continuing hard feelings among Okinawans about the 26,000 U.S. troops, out of 48,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan, stationed on Okinawa. About 75% of land occupied by U.S. military facilities in Japan FIGURE 1: SOFA STATUS CRIME STATISTICS is in Okinawa, despite the fact that the island represents less than 1% of Japan's total land area." 12 The people of Okinawa are also very well aware of the imbalance of restructuring and draw down that has occurred in other parts of Japan as opposed to their tiny prefecture. They are also aware of the significant reductions in U.S. forward presence in Europe because of the Figure 2 shows the overall U.S. military footprint, from the land area used, by prefecture within Japan. It offers further proof to the Okinawans that claim there is an unequal distribution of land area used to support U.S. forward deployed forces.
In 1995, the U.S. and Japanese governments, with representatives from the Okinawa Prefecture Government, formed a Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) to address some of these issues.
SPECIAL ACTION COMMITTEE OKINAWA (SACO)
The SACO agreements, the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process in the United
States, and the draw down in the early to mid 90's in Europe shared some very basic goals.
The U.S. military took significant reductions in infrastructure, fiscal resources, and significant force structure over a 4 to 6 year period in an effort to reduce operating expenses and the footprint our remaining forces would occupy. This was based on a change or a perceived change to the threat from the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact nations and it allowed the U.S. and its NATO allies to reap a "peace benefit" by drawing down its forces in support of a crisis. Additionally, physical conditioning road marches would no longer be conducted on public roads. These were perhaps the easiest of the four major sections within the SACO agreements and all were implemented quickly. Okinawa. This dialogue led to the decision allowing civilian emergency vehicles access through U.S. facilities. The SACO committee was scheduled to conclude its work one year after the process began, but it is still in existence. From an Okinawan perspective, they thought there would be a reduction in both the footprint of U.S. facilities and in the total number of personnel stationed on the island. SACO has already reduced the amount of land area used by U.S.
forces and will reach its goal of 20% upon completion of the additional construction on bases that are slated for long term use. SACO actually represents the status quo course of action concerning U.S. military presence on Okinawa as part of the overall forward presence in the region. The process will continue over the next decade as the two governments reach agreement on additional details for facility relocations and return of unnecessary lands. This process does not fully address the other major concern from the Okinawans perspective, and that is the total number of U.S. personnel stationed there. Experts have offered other options for resolution of the situation.
Before moving into the discussion of these possible courses of action, I want to offer a few recommendations on what some of our current initiatives should be that may help reduce the tensions we continuously hear or read about from the media. These recommendations are separate actions that can be implemented quickly, as opposed to the other long-term courses of action that will require years to fully implement.
TENSION REDUCTION
Following the unfortunate rape of the young Okinawan girl in 1995, the U.S. military 
COURSES OF ACTION (COA)
There are literally hundreds of thousands of pages on the subject of the U.S.-Japanese security relationship, clearly understandable based on the importance of this relationship over the past fifty-plus years. Unfortunately, there seem to be as many opinions on how to proceed, as there are pages on the subject. Almost all of these sources include specific reference to U.S.
forces stationed in Okinawa. The topic is virtually impossible to avoid based on the number of personnel stationed there, the media attention any incident of personnel misconduct receives, and the sheer strategic importance that the infrastructure as well as the significance of the geographic location. However, three basic courses of action or strategies emerge when trying to deal with the question of forward presence in Okinawa.
COA 1
The first is a continuation of a strong forward presence in the region, which means continuation of the current SACO process and no reduction of U.S. military personnel only further consolidation of the footprint on Okinawa. This course of action stems from the basic policy established under the Clinton Administration in the 1990s following a study conducted by the Department of Defense, which became known as the "Nye Report". In the report, Professor
Nye's opening paragraph includes the following statement, "Security is like oxygen: you do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it. The American security presence has helped to provide this "oxygen" for East Asian development." 14 His report outlined the differences in post-WWII development of Europe and the formation of NATO as opposed to the Asia-Pacific region where Japan, Korea, and China had unresolved issues and a basic distrust of each other's intentions.
For those supporters of the "Nye Report" and a continuation of a strong forward presence, they point to the continuing major causes of possible instability of the Asia-Pacific region. These include, North Korea which has taken on a new level of threat to its neighbors with their renewed interest in nuclear weapons, the unresolved status of Taiwan, and the uncertainty of China's long-term intentions as it struggles with advances in a capitalistic economy while continuing to be a communist form of government. There are countless other "threats" in the region that this group of experts cites as well. Most notably are the recent terrorist threats in the Philippines and Indonesia as well as the other nations with struggling economies and neighbors who argue over ancient territorial rights.
Continuation of current U.S. policy provides the advantages of reducing overhead costs for maintaining forward deployed forces in Japan, as the Japanese government provides a healthy percentage…"which in 1999 covered about 58% of the annual cost of stationing U.S.
forces… and the Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) provides logistical and rear area support as well. 15 Perhaps the greatest advantage of leaving these forces in Okinawa again comes down to its strategic location. In a crisis situation when response time can make a crucial difference in the early stages of a potential conflict it is important to keep the following in perspective, …it takes 2 hours to fly to the Korean peninsula from Okinawa, as compared with about 5 hours from Guam, 11 hours from Hawaii, and 16 hours from the continental United States. Similarly, it takes about 1-½ days to make the trip from Okinawa by ship to South Korea, as compared with about 5 days from Guam, 12 days from Hawaii, and 17 days from the continental United States.
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Finally, the infrastructure outlined earlier as part of the description of Okinawa's strategic importance would be extremely difficult to replace or, in the case of the C4ISR capabilities, irreplaceable elsewhere within the region. There are some risks of continuing with the SACO process and not addressing some of the issues raised by the people of Okinawa.
The most significant risk is the possibility that some external event, or "Gaiatsu" in the Japanese language, might cause a major shift in the current tolerance levels of U.S. military presence. This could potentially force the government of Japan to dramatically change its current policies. 17 The event could be another incident on the magnitude of the rape in 1995, or it could be a shift in the political support from the government on the mainland of Japan. The loss of forward basing access on Okinawa could be devastating to our military capability in the Asia-Pacific region. Shifting military forces to other locations in the region without prior preparations can be extremely costly from an economic and diplomatic sense. For those that argue this is not likely, history offers the recent example of loss of forward presence in the Philippines.
Especially after the victory of U.S.-led forces in the Gulf War and the eruption of Mt. Pinatubo which brought untold economic suffering to many Filipinos, no one in the Philippines could believe that what happened on September 16, 1991, was possible. Even the U.S. government, I think, including Pentagon and State Department officials could hardly believe it happened. Everyone underestimated the political will of the Philippine Senate, which rejected politically and officially the proposed bases treaty that would have allowed the United States to maintain its nuclear forces, troops and facilities in the Philippines for another ten years.
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The quote above comes from an article written in 1992 by a professor at the University of the The major advantage of this option comes from addressing the concerns raised by the people of Okinawa while maintaining access to the strategic infrastructure. This would increase U.S. military flexibility for smaller scale contingencies in the region, improve training opportunities for our forces with our other allies in the region, and it reduces the risk associated with the large concentration of forces in a small geographic footprint. It also helps the government of Japan in dealing with some its own economic issues and the discussion would lead to (more of sense of true partnership) between the two nations. It potentially frees up additional manpower for the current Global War on Terrorism, which is expected to go on indefinitely.
This position does increase the logistical requirements to support a more dispersed force;
potentially increases risk associated with massing a larger size force if necessary, and may require short and long term investments in infrastructure that does not currently exist. Some of that expense may be mitigated through negotiations with other nations in the region, such as Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines, if we have access to facilities for logistical support while operating in their area.
RECOMMENDATION
The security strategies of the United States and Japan are mutually reinforcing, reflecting the criticality of each country to the other's defense posture in the AsiaPacific region…The revised guidelines reflect continuity in the bilateral security partnership, reaffirming the security commitment to regional stability that both countries share. 26 From its inception as part of the security treaty in the early 1950s until today, the role of the U.S. military forces on Okinawa remain unchanged; they are part of the forward presence staged to respond to any potential contingency in the Asia-Pacific region as well as demonstrating U.S. commitment to security obligations.
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Reflecting on the continued importance from the statements above the U.S. should modify its current policy with regard to SACO and forward presence on Okinawa and pursue the third course of action outlined above. There is no immediate personnel number that is the right solution without an accompanying analysis of the overall threats to U.S. and Japanese interests.
What is clear is that the loss of access to Okinawa bases would severely hamper U.S. military operations in the Asia-Pacific region, undermining the stability that supports the continued economic development that is so vital to U.S. national interests. By understanding the historical development and cultural aspects of the people of Okinawa, we can better accommodate their concerns over our continued presence.
Each of the courses of action has some advantages, and other then some sort of total withdraw like what occurred with the Philippines, a comprehensive strategy would take time to implement. If the U.S. is moving to a new operational construct as part of its overall transformation efforts than this is the perfect time to tie that to a change in forward presence in the region. Rapid changes to basing in Okinawa without plans for follow on economic stimulus to replace the lost revenues, from a U.S. military draw down, would only add to the rhetoric of WORD COUNT=7,536
